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Liberal government, as analysed by Foucault, is a project of measured, utilitarian political activity, 
that takes ‘population’ as its object, dating back to the late seventeenth century. The rise of 
nationalism, authoritarianism and populism directly challenges this project, by seeking to re-
introduce excessive, gratuitous and performative modes of power back into liberal societies. This 
article examines the relationship and tensions between government and sovereignty, so as to make 
sense of this apparent ‘revenge of sovereignty on government’. It argues that neoliberalism has 
been a crucial factor in the return of sovereignty as a ‘problem’ of contemporary societies. 
Neoliberalism tacitly generates new centres of sovereign power, which have become publicly visible 





In his lectures on the genealogy of liberalism, Foucault states that “the essential issue of 
government will be the introduction of economy into political practice” (Foucault, 2007: 95). 
To govern is to seek a “suitable end”, which requires new infrastructures of intervention and 
measurement, such that power is deployed precisely and with known effects. Liberal 
government treats individuals as driven by natural desires, producing aggregate effects that 
can be discerned scientifically at the level of ‘population’. To do this, whole fields of 
statistics, demography, political economy and audit are developed, which indicate what 
outcomes are being achieved, with a level of precision that is distinctively governmental 
(Burchell, et al, 1991; Barry et al, 1996; Rose & Miller, 2013).  
 
Modern governing is a utilitarian exercise, which harnesses technologies of measurement 
and quantification to discern whether welfare (however defined) is being increased, and by 
what amount. It depends on networks of expertise and surveillance, that span state and non-
state entities, so as to render socio-economic processes visible, knowable and testable; this 
is broadly what Foucault referred to as the new ‘governmentality’ that emerged in the late 
seventeenth century. This “introduction of economy into political practice” allows wasteful, 
inefficient, excessive and ineffective interventions to be identified and changed. At the same 
time, government seeks to encompass an indefinite growth of life and prosperity (Leshem, 
2016). Governmentality involves a rise in the status and influence of experts in the running 
of state and non-state institutions, and for numerical facts to become a dominant form of 
public rhetoric (Desrosieres, 1998).  
 
Since the 1970s, neoliberal reforms have often extended this economisation and 
quantification of political practice. If liberal government deploys quantitative measures to 
evaluate matters of social and economic policy at the level of population (such as GDP), 
neoliberalism goes further by inciting individuals to view all choices as strategic investments 
for some calculable return (Foucault, 2008; Dardot & Laval, 2014). Social and political life is 
critically assessed using the same metrics as business (Brown, 2014), representing a form 
of ‘economic imperialism’ (Fine & Milonakis, 2009). The sovereign state itself is reconceived 
as a type of competitive enterprise, whose value is measured through blanket economic 
analysis and critique of its effects (Davies, 2014). Understood in these terms, neoliberalism 
implies a more relentless and suffocating form of ‘governmentality’ than liberalism.  
 
In the decade following the global financial crisis, however, various political developments 
disrupted this apparent economisation of the political. The ascendency of populist leadership 
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and rhetoric brought questions of ‘sovereignty’ back into the mainstream of political 
argument (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Resurgent nationalism and protectionism refocus 
attention on territory and borders, as the objects and limits of sovereign power. The vision of 
the radical right is of unmediated sovereign power, derived from a single people, dwelling in 
the unique territorial container to which they historically belong.  
  
There is an anti-economic quality to these political forces, which seeks excess in the form of 
political action, and not just as economic surplus. ‘Penal populism’, which seeks feelings of 
collective safety and solidarity via harsher regimes of punishment (regardless of effects), has 
increased since 2008 (Pratt & Miao, 2017; Carvalho & Chamberlen, 2018). Support for 
nationalists correlates strongly with possession of ‘authoritarian’ values, which translate into 
support for greater use of violence by the state and within the family on principle (Norris & 
Ingelhart, 2018) and with ‘anti-vax’ attitudes and behaviours (Kennedy, 2019). The 
orthodoxies of liberal economics are flouted, on questions of trade, international regulation 
and immigration, resulting in acts of ‘economic self-harm’ such as Brexit. In its place, a 
desire for punishment of ‘elites’ appears to supplant faith in collective progress, creating a 
new economy of rage and retribution (Sloterdijk, 2012; Magni, 2017). Authority is 
reconfigured in ways that disregard the measurable consequences of actions, in favour of 
what they signal and how they divide people. 
 
These developments are plainly opposed to the edifice of liberal government described by 
Foucault, but their relationship to neoliberal ideas and policy is more ambiguous. Populist 
leaders may take aim at centres of governmental power (such as central banks), but the 
relationship between neoliberalism and nationalism is less antagonistic than it may initially 
appear (Harmes, 2012). Nationalists such as Donald Trump, Viktor Orban and Jair 
Bolsonaro have combined economic de-regulation with social and political illiberalism 
(Hendrikse, 2018). Forms of ‘mutant neoliberalism’ are developing, which successfully wed 
aspects of the neoliberal project to the new forces of populism and nationalism (Callison & 
Manfredi, 2020). Indeed, nationalism arguably radicalises and territorialises existing 
elements of neoliberal and financial rationality, against de-valued and dis-credited 
populations or races (Feher, 2019; Slobodian, 2018b). We may be witnessing a different 




State theorists have theorised such ‘authoritarian’ developments in terms of the state’s 
declining concern with democratic and/or normative legitimacy. Following Poulantzas, the 
notion of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ sees a new strain of neoliberalism developing post-
2008, that abandons the quest for democratic consent, in favour of exceptional and extra-
democratic means (Poulantzas, 1978; Bruff, 2014). The key conflict here is between the 
executive branch of government and the legislature, a conflict which can be heightened by 
the ‘authoritarian populist’ claim that only the executive is truly acting on behalf of ‘the 
people’ (Hall et al, 1978; Hall, 1985). But in this paper, I approach the problem somewhat 
differently, taking inspiration from Foucault rather than Poulantzas. The conflict that 
concerns me is not between democratic and executive authority, but between governmental 
and sovereign problematics and technologies of power. If “the essential issue of government 
will be the introduction of economy into political practice”, what might it mean for economy to 
be ejected from political practice? How and why might forms of excessive, wasteful and 
violent power be re-introduced? This re-introduction represents what I term the revenge of 
sovereignty on government.  
 
Led by Agamben, numerous scholars of economic theology have challenged the depth of 
Foucault’s separation between ‘government’ and ‘sovereignty’, together with the chronology 
that Foucault attributes to this split (Agamben, 2011; Leshem, 2016; Dean, 2016, 2019). 
From such perspectives, the modern appearance of a wholly immanent and physiological 
domain of politics (which Foucault takes often at face value) hides not only its theological 
precedents, but also the residual ways in which sovereign power acts vicariously via 
governmental power. The model of political power that Agamben traces from early 
Christianity through to the present is one of delegation, which stands back from active 
intervention so as to allow ‘providence’ to work, and yet – by force of analogy and 
‘signatures’ – mediates the transcendent and immanent. This means that government and 
economics are not as isolated from either metaphysics or political sovereignty as their 
positivist discourses presuppose.  
 
Nevertheless, we can follow Foucault in tracing the emergence of a liberal problem of 
government, where a plane of political immanence is discursively and technologically 
constructed, as a site of intervention and knowledge. In Desrosiere’s useful term, this space 
of political physics ‘holds together’ with the aid of numbers, methods, material technologies 
and experts, in relative (though never absolute) independence from the state (Desrosieres, 
1998). No doubt, its capacity to cohere as quasi-natural objectivity requires a supportive 
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state, willing to impose ‘economy’ upon itself and secure a space of emergent, decentralised 
processes. This space is equally liable to ‘fall apart’, which may occasion a collapse 
between spaces of government and sovereignty. With this in mind, it becomes apparent that, 
in recent years, the terrain on which government seeks to operate has become visibly and 
publicly re-constituted by sovereign action.  
 
The question to be addressed here is of the role of neoliberal rationality in this re-emergence 
of sovereignty as a problem, and its manifest departure from instruments and discourses of 
government. In Agamben’s terms, we are witnessing a move against ‘vicarious’ logics of 
power in favour of direct, unmediated and patriarchal forms of power, or pure sovereigntist 
decision. Foucault uses the metaphor of a ‘blockage’ to government, that was ‘unblocked’ 
following the Westphalian settlement of sovereignty. In a similar vein, neoliberalism has 
contributed to an ‘unblocking’ of sovereign discourses and problematics, which have been 
brought into the open since 2008.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I return to Foucault’s account of the 
distinction between ‘government’ and ‘sovereignty’, and of how the perspective of the former 
became ‘unblocked’ in early modern Europe. Though not without their limitations and critics, 
Foucault’s insights point to various conditions of government, and various ways in which it 
can fail or recede, that are relevant to our situation today. Secondly, I consider the shifting 
relationship between government and sovereignty under neoliberalism. While neoliberal 
rationality is frequently associated with ubiquitous economisation, it also facilitates a crisis in 
the perspective on population that is so central to governmentality, opening the space for 
populism as an alternative. And finally, I consider some of the empirical symptoms and 




The ‘unblocking’ of government (or the ‘blocking’ of sovereignty?) 
 
The modern distinction between sovereignty and government typically hangs on the 
potential of the former for excessive, unmeasured action, that offers the preconditions of law 
and civil society (Hobbes, 1996). Schmitt’s focus on the capacity to decide on ‘the exception’ 
highlights that sovereignty transcends the distinction between legal and illegal, providing law 
with its condition of possibility (Schmitt, 2010). The extra-legal dimensions of such power, 
 6 
whose decisions can encompass matters of life and death, are mirrored in the figure of what 
Agamben terms ‘bare life’, a type of living being who lacks either legal or religious status, 
and whose very existence is decided on by another (Agamben, 1998).  
 
Foucault’s account of sovereignty shares this necro-political interpretation: “it is the right to 
take life or let live” (Foucault, 2004: 240; Mbembe, 2019). He then contrasts this sharply with 
a type of biopolitical power (“the power to make live”), which is dedicated to producing life, 
and which is manifest in modern government (Foucault, 2004: 247). Government produces 
and acts within a wholly immanent plane, as a naturalistic perspective on economy and 
society, aimed at the growth of life and wealth. Distinguishing between power to kill and 
power to satisfy vital needs and desires, Foucault sees liberalism progressively reducing 
(though never eliminating) the space of the former. Government exists only in being 
exercised, rather than as power held in reserve, and penetrates non-state and ‘non-political’ 
spheres of conduct, so as to test, measure and optimise them (Barry et al, 1996; Foucault, 
2007; Rose & Miller, 2013).  This is a decentralised and heterogeneous set of processes, 
that deploys various forms of knowledge to improve society in various ways. It treats society 
as a natural object, amenable to its own internal laws, which are responsible for the growth, 
health and prosperity of populations in the aggregate. 
 
Such a strict separation between power to decide on life (sovereignty) and power to produce 
and optimise it (government) may present an unduly benign picture of actually existing 
liberal government. It risks obscuring the extent to which liberal societies have been ruled 
with combinations of force and calculation, law and economics (Dean, 2016). It potentially 
obscures the extent to which biopolitical expertise has crossed almost seamlessly between 
liberal and totalitarian political systems, where it is deployed by executive diktat (Agamben, 
1998). Contra Foucault, economic theologians have highlighted that economic reason 
remains shaped and guided by metaphysical accounts of life and growth, that exceed the 
limits of immanence (Agamben, 2011; Leshem, 2016; Dean, 2019). 
 
We ought therefore to approach Foucault’s binary between sovereignty and government with 
some caution, and attend to periodic combinations of the two. Nevertheless, this conceptual 
distinction names and illuminates a series of political transformations that characterise liberal 
modernity, even while none of these has been perfectly realised under actually existing 
liberalism. We can trace four key areas in Foucault’s thought where the contrast between 
sovereign and governmental problematics of power emerges most clearly, and often maps 
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onto distinctive political technologies. Firstly, sovereignty is exerted over territory, whereas 
government is exercised through the population (Foucault, 2007: 11). Sovereign power is 
limited by geography: it stops at certain borders, which are publicly declared. Governmental 
power, on the other hand, is limited by epistemology. Its capacity to discern the logic of 
demographic, social and economic change depends on the ability to collect adequate data 
and to produce adequate mathematical models, that can represent population. Population 
emerges as a new site and construct of power, which lies between that of the state and that 
of the family, and only becomes visible via demography. 
 
The status of the family is critical here. Where the family had once provided a template for 
political and moral authority, and an analogue for the authority of the state itself, it now 
became a quasi-natural feature of populations to be acted upon and through. “The family will 
change from being a model to being an instrument; it will become a privileged instrument for 
the government of the population rather than a chimerical model for good government” 
(Foucault, 2007: 105). Thus, as liberal government advanced over the 19th and 20th 
centuries, new ways of governing families so as to produce growing, healthy, active, 
productive populations were developed, including social workers and public health policies, 
where the family is one site of behavioural intervention among many (Rose, 1999).  
 
Secondly, sovereignty deploys restraints on movement, whereas liberal government aims for 
constant circulation and movement (Foucault, 2007: 45). Questions of sovereignty arise 
where borders are involved, as the delineation of territorial integrity and identity. The 
challenge of sovereignty is to keep the territorial order as it is, to prevent change, and to 
defend the sovereign (2007: 65). It depends equally on the capacity to overpower individual 
volition, and to remove freedom – to say ‘no’ to certain desires and choices, through law and 
the constraints of physical punishment (2007: 73). It follows that freedom (from the 
perspective of sovereignty) consists in doing whatever is not illegal. Government, on the 
other hand, seeks to keep trade flowing, populations moving, prices fluctuating and so on. In 
keeping with the logic of liberal economics, the territorial border becomes something to 
minimise and overcome, and price must be left to change ‘naturally’. The motor of population 
dynamics is individual desire, the natural spring which drives people to seek prosperity, 
social reproduction, health, security and longer life. Government works with desire rather 
than against it, harnessing the power of individual freedom to expand the life and wealth of 
the population (Rose, 1999). Maintaining and governing the circulation of people and goods 
is a means of securing the conditions of prosperity and social security. Even punishment is 
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conceived as a process, through which the guilty party is rehabilitated and their ‘interests’ 
are served. 
 
Thirdly, Foucault stresses, the logic of sovereignty is circular, whereas that of government is 
teleological. Sovereignty is exercised to demonstrate that it exists (as in the public torture 
and execution of its enemy), and therefore requires public performances. The reason for 
obeying the sovereign law is that it is the sovereign law. Government, by contrast: 
 
is not a matter of imposing a law on men, but of the disposition of things, that is to 
say, of employing tactics rather than laws, or of as far as possible employing laws as 
tactics; arranging things so that this or that end may be achieved through a certain 
number of means. 
(Foucault, 2007: 99). 
 
Where the purpose of sovereign acts is to assert themselves as sovereign, the goal of 
government is contingent on its object. It seeks to optimise populations and processes, in 
line with their immanent natural processes – to increase health, welfare, productivity and 
vitality, and to reduce the risk of disease, death, poverty, crop failure and destitution. This 
does not mean that there is no performative dimension to governmental practices, nor that 
they do not depend on affective and symbolic modes of authority, but it does imply that 
interventions are geared towards nurturing and releasing processes that are internal to the 
‘natural’ mechanics of society (Agamben, 2011).  
 
Finally, and as discussed at the outset, sovereignty exists as an excess of power, whereas 
good government consists in its precision and economy. The force of sovereignty lies in its 
capacity to over-power resistance and disobedience, and its public displays will typically 
involve parades of weaponry and force, as symbols of violent potential. Government, on the 
other hand, aims to intervene just enough to divert naturally-occurring processes towards 
the optimal outcome. As government morphs into liberal political economy, “the whole 
question of critical governmental reason will turn on how not to govern too much” (Foucault, 
2008: 13). Economists and calculative devices perform a critical function within and without 
the state, in questioning and delimiting the use of governmental power. Where government 
does make space for excess is not in force of political will, but in the constant growth of life 
and its satisfaction, brought within the mathematical constraints of economic reason 
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(Leshem, 2016). The latent metaphysics of government, unacknowledged by secular social 
science is its assumption of burgeoning, self-directing vitality, that is ultimately benign. 
 
According to Foucault, a space of governmental problems opened up in late seventeenth 
century Europe, just as a central problem of sovereignty had been resolved by the 
Westphalian territorial system. Governmental reason was thereby ‘released’, and “law 
recedes”, at least in the sense of not providing answers to the biopolitical questions that 
government strives to answer (Foucault, 2007: 99). This implies reduced reliance on 
spectacular symbols and gestures of power, and greater reliance on enclosed communities 
and networks of governmentality, or pure administration, though the spectacular is never 
abandoned altogether (Agamben, 2011). Mercantilism served as a transitional phase, 
between sovereign problematics (of territory, defence and warfare) and liberal governmental 
ones (with naturally occurring processes and movements). Growth in population size, trade, 
life expectancy, manufacture and agricultural production during this period served to 
authorise the naturalistic and expert perspective of government, and to highlight the 
limitations of sovereignty. The very notion of ‘progress’, as a measurable and predictable 
collective historical process, is a combined artefact of empirical expansion in material 
welfare and methodological advances in the modelling and tracking of that expansion. The 
ability to represent population statistically co-evolves with the ability to improve and grow 
population, and sovereign law can do neither. 
 
The political art of government, combined with new techniques of demographic knowledge, 
was therefore ‘unblocked’ as its benefits became more abundantly obvious over the course 
of the 18th century. Viewed from the opposite perspective, however, the question is how 
sovereignty becomes periodically ‘blocked’ or concealed. From the perspective of political 
theology, the separation of liberal government is never absolute, seeing as it depends tacitly 
on underlying reserves of sovereign power, and provides the very biopolitical territory that is 
most vulnerable to extra-legal sovereign decision (Agamben, 1998). Schmitt blamed the 
positivist epistemology of the natural sciences for encroaching into legal philosophy, and 
representing the metaphysics of sovereignty in merely mechanical terms (Schmitt, 2010: 
48). Vogl has argued that the emergence of a separate space of government at the close of 
the seventeenth century was a side-effect of the creation of national debts, which meant that 
sovereignty was now inevitably shared between military states and financial markets 
(mediated by central banks) (Vogl, 2017: 161).  
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In seeking to understand the shifting balance between government and sovereignty over 
time , we should note Foucault’s somewhat cryptic comments on how projects of 
government can fail, recede or meet resistance. Firstly, viewing people via the lens of 
‘population’ does not guarantee that they will act according to the natural and mathematical 
logic of population. It is possible that people will refuse to be governed according to the 
rationality of risk, price and utility maximisation, not least because these rationalities remain 
tacit and hidden as far as political actors are concerned. When this happens, they go from 
forming a ‘population’ to forming a ‘people’: 
 
The people comprise those who conduct themselves in relation to the management 
of the population, at the level of the population, as if they were not part of the 
population as a collective subject-object, as if they put themselves outside of it, and 
consequently the people are those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the 
system. 
(Foucault, 2007: 43-44) 
 
Secondly, throughout the history of governing (and long before the art of government began 
to displace sovereignty), governors have faced the problem of individual refusal: 
conscientious objectors, disruptors, dissidents. The quest for consensus in government is 
disrupted by forms of “counter-conduct”, of the single individual who refuses the authority of 
the governor, be it the priest, the teacher or the vaccinator. In the modern era, these 
disruptions and refusals may not claim any sovereignty of their own, but nevertheless play a 
crucial role in reversing the “introduction of economy into political practice”, as we witness 
today in cases of populist leadership, anti-vax movements, and rebellions against the ‘liberal 
elite’.  
 
On the basis of these reflections on government and sovereignty, the question might be 
posed: if Foucault is correct about some of the means by which problems of government 
expand, and those of sovereignty contract, how and why might this process be reversed? It 
is relatively clear, on the basis of Foucault’s analysis, what this reversal would consist of. 
Firstly, we would witness a resurgence in the politics of territory, protection and borders, and 
a decline in the politics of population and risk management. Secondly, we would see an 
expansion of political interventions aimed at fixing people, goods and prices in place, rather 
than releasing them to move according to their inner nature. Thirdly, we would encounter 
authority that operated with a logic of circularity, rather than of teleology, focused on 
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performing the symbols of power rather than delivering the outcomes of policy. And finally, 
we would see a demand that states rediscover the use of excessive force, including to kill, 
and dispense with the economic logic of efficiency and measurement. Fluctuations back and 
forth of this nature are no doubt frequent features of liberal and illiberal states. But the 
revenge of sovereignty on government has a particular character in the neoliberal context, 
which is initially counter-intuitive.  
 
 
The ambivalence of neoliberalism 
 
Neoliberalism is frequently identified with ubiquitous economisation, that reduces political 
metaphysics to a form of economic physics (Davies, 2014). By that account, neoliberalism 
represents a more complete “governmentalisation” of the state (Foucault, 2007: 108) than 
had previously been achieved. The rise of ‘new public management’, national 
‘competitiveness’ agendas, privatisations and outsourcing of public services from the 1980s 
produced a new type of state, modelled on the idea of business enterprise, and seemingly 
shorn of its sovereign qualities. The rise of ‘governance’ discourses over the 1990s was 
emblematic of neoliberal trends towards suppressing the distinctiveness of political and 
democratic spheres (Brown, 2014). The period in which this anti-political governmental 
expansion was underway was also the one in which participation in democratic politics was 
steadily declining (Mair, 2013).  
 
Brown has argued that neoliberal critique originates in opposition to fascism as much as of 
socialism, and it is the need to constrict or eliminate ‘the political’ that shapes and motivates 
the neoliberal project from its inception (Brown, 2014). To use the taxonomy derived from 
Foucault in the previous section, neoliberalism certainly witnesses an ascendency of 
governmental over sovereign interventions in a number of critical respects. Firstly, the long 
history of neoliberal critique demonstrates an effort to transcend the constraints of territory, 
at least as they are asserted over market activity. Slobodian’s history of the Geneva School 
summarises their project as one of “ordo-globalism”, in which economic regulations would be 
lifted out of any territorial container and operate on a global scale (Slobodian, 2018a: 11-12). 
The birth of the European Commission, NAFTA and the World Trade Organisation represent 
victories for the anti-national, de-territorialising project of neoliberalism.  
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Secondly, and following this, neoliberalism is quite explicitly dedicated to securing 
spontaneous movement, at least where prices, goods, services and capital are concerned. It 
is a project in constraining the power of states with respect to the movements that emerge 
spontaneously from markets. The ‘spontaneous order’ imagined by Hayek encompassed 
prices, consumption, investment and trade, although didn’t necessarily allow a similar 
freedom to people (Slobodian, 2018b). Nevertheless, there is a distinctively neoliberal mode 
of social government that aims to energise, activate, ‘de-proletarianise’ and coach the 
population, such that it is psychologically and culturally adapted to enterprise, innovation and 
risk-taking (Dardot & Laval, 2014; Bonefeld, 2017). As seen in the case of the ‘third way’ 
during the 1990s, this can manifest itself in high levels of social spending, where 
investments are aimed at upgrading ‘human capital’ and reducing ‘dependency’.  
 
Thirdly, neoliberalism can be seen as a governmental project inasmuch as it has unleashed 
a wide range of new forms of utilitarianism. Regulation and anti-trust have been refashioned 
around the Chicago School doctrine of consumer welfare maximisation, or what is referred 
to in the anti-trust world as the ‘effects-based’ approach (Davies, 2010). The logic of capital 
and capitalisation injects a calculative mentality into new spheres of education, the family, 
healthcare and community (Cooper, 2017). Excess and surplus are funnelled into the 
economic realm, in the maximisation of profit, consumer satisfaction and private wealth, 
rather than permitted to be exercised in public in the form of sovereign action. 
 
At the same time, neoliberal states have displayed some strongly punitive and authoritarian 
qualities, that dispense with economic rationality.  As observers of Thatcherism and 
Reaganism noted early on, these regimes combined respect for economic freedoms with 
more aggressive criminal justice policies (Hall, 1979; Gamble, 1988; Wacquant, 2009). In 
the sphere of criminal justice, the demise of Benthamite rational punishment, and rise of 
‘penal populism’, coincided with the start of the Thatcherite era (Pratt & Miao, 2017). This is 
consistent with elements of neoliberal thought, especially in the ordoliberal tradition, where 
elements of authoritarianism were present from the outset, as a way of rescuing the free 
market from socialism and the type of democratic collapse witnessed in Weimar Germany 
(Bonefeld, 2017). The separation of market laws (and especially property rights) from the 
space of democratic politics is itself an act of sovereign decision, pitting a de-territorialised 
market sovereign against that of the nation state (Slobodian, 2018a: 138).  
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Crucially, while neoliberalism may resist national territorialism, it’s not clear that it commits to 
the liberal perspective on ‘population’ (which Foucault saw as a hallmark of liberal 
government) as its alternative, either in theory or in practice. For instance, the Keynesian 
statistical construct of ‘the economy’ (Mitchell, 1998) is viewed with scepticism within the 
Austrian neoliberal tradition, which instead treats ‘the economy’ as sublime and invisible 
(Slobodian, 2018a: 86). In the space of welfare and social policy, neoliberal reforms act 
against the logic of ‘the social’ as a macro-object of risk calculation (Rose, 1996). Neoliberal 
policies may involve increased public spending and policy intervention in social life, but 
specifically so as to re-privatise risks of unemployment, ill-health, and family break-down, 
and create a greater sense of personal responsibility on the part of job-seekers, patients and 
parents (Cooper, 2017). Foucault argues that ‘civil society’ was born during the 18th century, 
as a new sphere of conduct that lay between sovereign law (governed by norms) and market 
reason (governed by calculation), that is irreducible to either the political or the economic 
(Foucault, 2008: 295). ‘Society’ becomes a space and object of governmental intervention 
with the rise of the welfare state in the late 19th century (Donzelot, 1991). But neoliberal 
critique gradually undermines the integrity and visibility of this once-separate domain of 
existence, re-dividing ‘social’ concerns into those that are matters to be dealt with by law, 
and those that are the moral responsibility of the individual. While this project may not 
entirely succeed, its aspiration is the dismantling of infrastructures of governmentality that 
view events such as unemployment and ill-health as problems that are distributed across 
populations, to be viewed in terms of statistical probability. These are amongst the reasons 
that some have read Foucault as an enthusiast for neoliberal critique (Zamora & Behrent, 
2016),    
 
Neoliberal political reason therefore weaves between the zones of government and 
sovereignty, muddying the distinction itself. It deploys an immanentist governmental logic to 
attack sovereignty, and a sovereigntist logic to attack governmentality. The result is an 
integration of sovereignty and government, that bestows a form of extra-legal authority upon 
economic decision and calculation. Traditionally sovereign centres and modes of power 
become constrained and hollowed out by rationalities of calculation (as manifest in Chicago 
School law and economics, for example) while conventionally governmental institutions 
(such as the welfare state) are empowered to act with impunity and without regard to 
measurable consequences. The icon of this hybrid sovereign-governmental power is the 
central bank, where economic calculation is wedded to decisionism, embodied in the figure 
of the charismatic central banker. Vogl captures this unwieldy fusion, in describing central 
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banks as “government of last resort”: the sovereign becomes governmental, and 
government becomes sovereign (Vogl, 2018: 121). This is not sovereign power deployed 
vicariously, but sovereignty displaced to monetary institutions.   
 
The ambition to create a hybrid sovereign-governmental power has long been a discrete 
feature of European neoliberal thought. Slobodian reveals numerous schemes proposed by 
the Geneva School (such as Mises’ Eastern Democratic Union), which sought to hand legal 
powers over to transnational technocratic bodies that would be virtually invisible to the 
nations they ruled over, while traditional symbols of national sovereignty would survive as 
ultimately meaningless and empty cultural artefacts (Slobodian, 2018a). But the precise 
effect of the global financial crisis has been to bring this into the open: to reveal publicly that 
sovereignty resides with the technocrats of the central banks and the regulators, inasmuch 
as they possess the power to declare the ‘exception’ and to draw on the limitless power of 
the state to rescue the market system in its state of emergency (Davies, 2013; Tooze, 2018). 
Government is no longer the delegate of the sovereign or a separate space of immanence, 
but now appears as executive decision-maker. Demanding that this sovereignty be returned 
to ‘the people’ (which currently belongs to institutions such as the ECB or the Federal 
Reserve) has, at least rhetorically, been a key component of the populist surge since 2008 
(Revelli, 2019).  
 
The fusion of law and economics, sovereignty and government, was neoliberalism’s secret, 
that was never meant to be acknowledged in public, and struggles for legitimacy once 
revealed. The liberal appearance of an immanent economic space, separate from the state, 
is (or was) crucial to the authority of economics, that presents itself in wholly epistemic 
terms. As Vogl argues, the power of central banks prior to 2008 had depended upon the 
illusion that they were not political actors at all, and they struggle to define their public role 
once their autonomy and political power is nakedly visible (Vogl, 2018). Prior to 2008, 
neoliberal welfare reforms could be justified on the basis that they were ultimately welfare-
enhancing, but in the post-2008 context of austerity, the very same policies and reforms 
appeared nakedly punitive, gratuitous and harmful (Davies, 2016). Austerity itself, justified 
on the false basis that it would generate prosperity, is exemplary of a new style of neoliberal 
policy-making, that has broken free of utilitarian calculation, operating instead with a 
sovereign logic of circularity: it is exercised simply because it must be, not because of its 
effects. The liberal-economic ontology of governing in the interest of individual ‘interests’ 
evaporates. The global financial crisis famously did not derail neoliberalism (Crouch, 2011; 
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Mirowski, 2013), but it fundamentally altered its optics, with destructive implications for the 
kinds of legitimacy claims that the neoliberal state was able to make. Once the neoliberal 
state appears simultaneously more authoritarian and more technocratic, it is both 
strengthened and weakened at the same time (Bruff, 2014).  
 
The legitimacy of neoliberalism, from the mid-1970s to 2008, was therefore heavily 
dependent on carefully managed optics, that concealed contradictions. Neoliberal political 
rationality offered no space for the public, performative aspect of state sovereignty qua 
sovereignty, hoping to locate executive decision-making out of sight. Instead, various 
mirages of sovereign authority are offered instead: nation-branding takes the symbols and 
traditions of the nation state, and subsumes them under a logic of business investment and 
market positioning (Aronczyk, 2013); ‘national competitiveness’ agendas subject the 
executive branch of the state and ‘the people’ to an economic audit, in terms of their 
attractiveness to mobile capital (Davies, 2014). What Mirowski terms the “double truth” of 
neoliberalism, namely the ‘truth’ presented to the public (the market as natural order) versus 
the ‘truth’ understood by neoliberals themselves (markets require construction and 
enforcement), leads inevitably to a type of phenomenological crisis, in which the displays 
and the exercise of sovereignty end up in different places, generating a crisis of credulity 
(Mirowski, 2013). 2008 pulled back the screen on this optical illusion, undermining its liberal 
and democratic ambitions to legitimacy or hegemony.  
 
 
The ‘unblocking’ of sovereignty (or the ‘blocking’ of government?)  
 
The event of the global financial crisis, and the decade that followed it, contains 
considerable instances of “economy” being ejected from “political practice”. Crucially, and 
unlike prior historical instances of this reversal, this transition is one that has occurred within 
the logic and historical practices of neoliberalism, producing populist mutations of 
neoliberalism, rather than as a challenge to it (Callison & Manfredi, 2020). If the project of 
neoliberalism had always been ambivalent towards the place of sovereignty, choosing 
instead to discretely merge it with government behind a liberal veneer, sovereignty becomes 
wholly ‘unblocked’ and visible from 2008 onwards. Meanwhile, the perspective and the 
visage of liberal government recede. This is manifest in the following ways.  
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First and foremost, the initial state response to the financial crisis was clearly one of excess, 
and not of economy. The entire logic of the bank bail-outs and subsequently the response to 
the Euro crisis was to do “whatever it takes”. The authorities acted in a way that was 
distinctively Hobbesian, in the sense that their interventions were geared to performing their 
limitless willingness and power to act, as an optical effect. Hank Paulson told a Senate 
Banking Committee: 
 
It you’ve got a squirt gun in your pocket, you may have to take it out. If you’ve got a 
bazooka, and people know you’ve got it, you may not have to take it out. 
(Quoted in Tooze, 2018: 173). 
 
Governmental tactics are the ‘squirt gun’, that are useful to the extent that it they are 
practically effective, while sovereignty is the ‘bazooka’ whose power resides in not having to 
be used – a wholly Hobbesian line of reasoning. But in the process, the expert economic 
claims that had been made for ‘good’ regulation and policy dating back to the 1970s were 
abandoned, and the space for excessive political action in and over the economy is re-
opened (Tooze, 2018: 165). Economists in treasury departments and central banks found 
themselves in the sovereign position of deciding on the exception, and were even installed 
as emergency Prime Ministers in cases such as Italy (Davies, 2013). Tooze notes that the 
Euro crisis of 2010-12 was only brought under political control at the moment in June 2012 
when the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, publicly declared that the 
ECB would “do whatever it takes to preserve the Euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” 
(quoted, Tooze, 2018: 438). Tooze notes that this statement was “self-fulfilling. He spoke the 
magic words.” (Tooze, 2018: 444). The authority of economic calculation shifts from a 
utilitarian one to an explicitly performative one, inasmuch as the task of the economist is to 
send credible signals regarding what the state is able and willing to do. To be sure, this had 
long been true of central banking, albeit formally unacknowledged (Braun, 2015). But a 
consequence of the financial crisis was to render the ‘performativity of economics’ (both in 
the state and in the financial sector) an undeniable dimension of how economic institutions 
worked (Callon, 1998). Experts who once sought only the acclaim of their peers (the basis of 
liberal consensus) now sought the acclaim of a people. 
 
Meanwhile, if liberal government depends on the credibility of ‘population’ as a space and 
object of intervention, various forces have weakened the credibility of this perspective, 
especially those that followed the financial crisis and austerity regimes in Europe. As the 
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previous section detailed, the critical logic of neoliberal reforms had long been to weaken the 
coherence and credibility of population (and associated rationality of socially calculable 
risks), such that macro-objects of economy and society no longer ‘hold together’, in the 
conventionalist sense (Desrosieres, 1998). However, we can point to various developments 
both before and after 2008 that indicate that what Foucault termed the ‘security’ of 
population was no longer being pursued. In particular, austerity programs in Europe and the 
renunciation of fiscal policy from 2010 onwards demonstrated that economic growth was no 
longer a primary objective of economic policy. Arguably, neoliberalism has never privileged 
growth per se, and yet a remnant of Keynesian sensibility persisted especially after the 
defeat of inflation in the early 1980s.  
 
But other forms of growth also stalled, such as health and life expectancy. Mortality rates in 
Britain and France started to rise in 2011, for the first time in decades, and life expectancy in 
Britain fell in 2015-16 for reasons associated with austerity (Hiam, 2017; Dorling, 2017). In 
the United States, the so-called ‘Case-Deaton effect’ found a steady rise in the mortality rate 
amongst middle-aged white non-Hispanics starting at the turn of the century, eventually 
leading to a declining life expectancy of this group by 2013 (Case & Deaton, 2015). These 
deaths are associated with the absence or withdrawal of social safety nets and social 
healthcare provision, especially in the context of austerity programmes. However, they are 
also connected to self-destructive behaviours, resulting from increases in suicide, poisoning 
and lifestyles that result in heart disease – what Case and Deaton dubbed “deaths of 
despair”. The fall-out from the financial crisis is estimated to have caused an additional 
10,000 suicides globally (O’Hara, 2017), while in Greece the male suicide rate rose by 20% 
in 2007-09 (Stuckler & Basu, 2013).  
 
These are symptoms of a state-driven economic and biopolitical recession, that departs from 
the ostensibly progressive logic of liberal government. What Foucault calls the ‘problem of 
population’ came into being as a specific problem of aggregate growth: how to nurture it, 
manage it, accelerate it. Growth in population, health and wealth would arise naturally due to 
individuals acting on desires in the marketplace and society, so long as government 
calculated and offset risks of disease, crop failure, poverty and other threats to life. Absent 
growth, Foucault implies, and ‘population’ would not be a meaningful construct in the first 
place (just as ‘the economy’ comes into being as a result of policy-makers seeking to grow 
the aggregate). We might surmise that ‘population’ struggles to retain its epistemic and 
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political hold over collective life, once prosperity, health and life are progressively shrinking 
rather than increasing.  
 
Post-2008 neoliberalism witnesses a disintegration in the liberal governmentality that 
anchored individual subjectivity in broader infrastructures of security and welfare 
improvements. The liberal economic idea of ‘interests’ referred to a calculable telos for both 
individual decision-making (in the market) and for policy formation (in society), serving to 
weld the rationality of individual psychology to that of the governmental state. But this 
category no longer works, where markets, debt and labour market policies take on a 
moralistic and punitive function, that is more focused on the allocation of responsibility and 
duty, than the distribution of welfare (Lazzarato, 2012; Davies, 2016). Austerity regimes take 
on features that Foucault attributes to sovereignty, delimiting and destroying life, rather than 
of government which exists to produce and expand life. As Foucault observed of sovereign 
power, the purpose is to ensure that things don’t change, and that the existing balance of 
power remains constant (Foucault, 2007: 165).  
 
Foucault’s observation that, where people refuse to be a ‘population’, they form a ‘people’ 
instead, is highly relevant here. Only, it is less an individual refusal to be a population than a 
steady neoliberal disbanding of the ontology of population as a space of governmental 
action and improvement. Steve Bannon’s 2017 comment, that the goal of Trumpism was the 
“deconstruction of the administrative state”, represents a continuity between neoliberal 
critiques of liberal government and populist ones. The possibility and desirability of what 
Foucault terms individual “counter-conduct” rises, under circumstances where government is 
no longer seeking to secure the conditions of increased prosperity and life. Post-2008, the 
space was opened for a new type of ‘dissident’ – the maverick celebrity and political 
entrepreneur, who challenges the foundational norms of liberalism – to disrupt the political 
arena. Thus the conditions are put in place to form and mobilise ‘a people’, who are resistant 
to the calculative logic of social risk and the governmental aspiration towards constant 
movement of people, goods, capital and prices. If the prime example of the population being 
‘secured’ is that of mass inoculation (Foucault, 2007: 62), which treats disease in the 
aggregate, anti-vax movements are manifestations of ‘counter-conduct’ in action, where 
individuals dissent from the logic of collective risk and form a ‘people’.  
 
Linked to this politically is the development of digital techniques of data-mining and 
algorithmic analysis, which contest the power of liberal statistical tools of population 
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construction (Savage & Burrows, 2007). If we accept that the liberal governmental ‘gaze’, 
which seeks to sort people into stable categories (such as ‘employed’ and ‘unemployed’; 
‘married’ and ‘single’) is a constituent part of how individuals come to conceive of 
themselves as subjects within populations, bestowed with interests (Ruppert, 2007), then we 
should also consider how the spread of ubiquitous data capture facilitates a different relation 
of micro and macro, individual and whole. Crucially, the subject of data capture does not 
need to conceive of or present themselves in accordance to static categories, which 
translate into interests; rather they leave traces of evidence, from which emergent patterns 
and then classifications can then be discerned. And it is not their proximity to a statistical 
norm that is being evaluated (as is the case under liberal government), but their exceptional 
identifiers that are sought. There is no form of refusal or “counter-conduct” that truly disrupts 
this technology, and the individual is never expected to form a stable unit within a population 
in the first place. Dissent, disruption and refusal become valuable data points through which 
to learn about affects and behaviours, a mode of algorithmic control that treats the subject 
as the bearer of passions rather than interests.  
 
The apparatus of liberal governmentality emerged from the late 17th century onwards 
through alliances between states, scientific societies and mercantile networks. The project 
that united them was an epistemological one, of producing stable, public and consensual 
representations of economy and society, in the form of the ‘modern fact’ (Poovey, 1998). By 
contrast, the apparatus of digital data capture has developed through the meeting of two 
rationalities, both of which operate outside of the liberal public sphere: market research and 
military intelligence. The shared project is one of control, of pre-empting, steering and 
learning from behaviour, with a view to controlling it not modelling or representing it. Aside 
from the fact that they necessarily operate in secret (and therefore do not produce statistical 
objects that ‘hold together’ as public conventions), they also produce new centres of 
sovereignty that can decide on which individuals are permitted to cross borders, receive 
credit, be picked out for questioning or receive social entitlements (Amoore, 2013; O’Neill, 
2016). With techniques of predictive data analytics and psychographic profiling moving 
seamlessly between military, commerce, policing and electoral politics, so the Foucauldian 
distinction between sovereign and biopolitical power becomes untenable. Instruments and 
tactics of power that originate beyond the borders of liberal society, exercised extra-legally 
over ‘bare life’, encroach into civil society.  
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These are amongst the various ways in which the problem of sovereignty has been renewed 
since 2008, and the terrain of government has shrunk. The fragmenting of the perspective 
on population, and the exposure of neoliberal technocracy as excessive and sovereign in 
nature, resurrects sovereign questions as to where the ultimate and final source of power 
lies. This produces the conditions in which nationalist, populist, protectionist, territorial and 
neo-reactionary appeals to ‘sovereignty’ can flower, and take their revenge upon 
governmentality that had once appeared to eliminate metaphysics from the arena of politics. 
A cultural symptom of this has been the apparent epistemological crisis of liberal politics, in 
which modern facts and figures no longer seem to function publicly in a representative 
capacity, but become performative, affective and symbolic. Sovereignty, which seeks to 
prevent movement, to fix in place, and to resist progress, renders the border (and threats to 





There is rising appreciation that the populist and nationalist uprisings that occurred in the 
context of post-2008 neoliberalism were not so much reactions against neoliberalism, as 
mutations within it. New synthetic categories such as ‘neo-illiberalism’ capture the fact that, 
in contexts such as the Trump administration and reactionary populism in Europe, neoliberal 
economic logic is being welded together with a punitive, moralistic one (Hendrikse, 2018; 
Brown, 2019; Callison & Manfredi, 2020). Moreover, the expansion of an ‘enterprising’, 
profit-seeking mentality into every corner of social and political life provides unexpected 
legitimation for the type of clientalist opportunism of populist leaders who exploit their power 
for personal and family gain, blending business interests with the state. This paper broadly 
shares this diagnosis, identifying a continuity between the neoliberal ambivalence towards 
liberal government, that turns into hostility post-2008, and thereby ‘releases’ a fresh 
‘problem’ of sovereignty.  
 
While many perspectives on the new authoritarianism focus on the escalating conflict 
between constitutional democracy and executive power, my Foucauldian approach has 
emphasised the changing balance between sovereign and governmental problematics and 
technologies of power. This retains the central advantage of Foucauldian political theory: it 
de-centres the state, and always considers the state in relation to non-state networks of 
knowledge, calculation and control. Sovereignty is a curious entity, in that where it is most 
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firmly established, it ceases to be a ‘problem’, and then appears to recede. It becomes 
ritualistically performed to confirm its existence, but is no longer relied upon, precisely 
because it is recognised. It is at this point that it is able to act vicariously via delegates of 
experts and networks of governmentality, producing the illusion that it has withdrawn from 
‘economy’ and ‘society’ altogether. Sovereignty is always a partly phenomenological 
achievement, which confirms the availability of limitless, quasi-theological reserves of power, 
through symbols and public performances. But it becomes a ‘problem’ when such 
performances cease to work effectively, when the identity of the sovereign is thrown into 
question, and when it becomes enmeshed in governmental problems all over again.  
 
That sovereignty has reappeared as a problem post-2008 is initially a symptom of the fact 
that economy was violently ejected from political practice during the financial crisis. Once 
released like this, it is difficult to re-embed it again quickly. But, in conclusion, we might also 
speculatively consider the extent to which sovereignty is being problematised by uncertainty 
over where it ultimately resides. There are numerous contenders in play. First of all, there is 
the neoliberal ideal that sovereignty ought ultimately to lie with the price system of a sublime, 
un-knowable global economy, outside of any political control (Slobodian, 2018). This is a 
type of “negative theology”, where the final decision rests outside of all institutions. The 
neoliberal financial system pulls towards this teleology, doing considerable harm to the 
credibility of democracy in the process (Streeck, 2017), but ultimately remains dependent on 
state sovereignty as exercised by central banks and treasury departments, an alliance that 
becomes public in the context of bail-outs and quantitative easing, resulting in political 
outrage that swiftly turns into a counter-sovereignty of ‘the people’. The libertarian response 
to this is to push sovereignty towards state-less forms of finance and money – crypto-
currencies and extra-legal types of code.  
 
Secondly, giant technology platforms (and their algorithms) are increasingly acting as final 
decision-makers over the regulation of markets, security enforcement and arbitration of civil 
disputes (Pasquale, 2015). Pasquale refers to the “functional sovereignty” of platforms such 
as Amazon, which act as regulators and lawmakers for markets, as much as competitors in 
the market (Pasquale, 2018). Van Loo refers to “the corporation as courthouse”, whereby 
ratings agencies and other intermediaries are responsible for dispensing justice to 
consumers, borrowers and internet users in general (Van Loo, 2016). Facebook announced 
plans in 2019 to establish its version of a ‘Supreme Court’ for content moderation, whose 
authority would be higher than any Facebook employee. And as data analytics firms become 
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increasingly critical to state security services and border control, sovereignty drifts towards 
the private sector contractors who have the ultimate decision regarding the threat level of a 
given individual (Amoore, 2013). Judgement drifts towards opaque codes and algorithms, 
which exist in a permanent state of exception, neither within nor without the law. 
 
Then there is the populist appeal to ‘the people’ as the source of sovereignty, whose will is 
executed via their leader. Populism, as its leading theorists have noted, is a rhetoric first and 
foremost, and is heavily dependent on a complicit media (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; 
Müller, 2017). It takes aim at those in public offices of various kinds (including journalists, 
judiciary, civil service and professional politicians), and dismisses them as a single, corrupt 
‘elite’, and suggests that sovereignty belongs to the ‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ people. No doubt this 
is highly dangerous, especially when it is wedded to ethno-nationalist delineations of ‘the 
people’. It accelerates the corrosion and dismantling of liberal proceduralism, and creates 
space for demagoguery. It accelerates the ejection of economy from political practice, and 
especially from political rhetoric, with rhetorical excess and violent metaphor becoming 
crucial to the charismatic authority of the leader. However, beyond the rhetoric of national 
and popular sovereignty, the populists of the post-2008 era have not shown much 
willingness or ability to contest the non-national sovereignties of financial markets and 
platforms. In that sense, the appeal to ‘the people’ is a performative act of valorisation and 
differentiation, that has the ‘circular’ quality that Foucault associated with sovereignty, and 
rejects the utilitarian logic of ‘population’. But lacking legal or constitutional foundations, it 
can equally be seen as an extension of a neoliberal logic of accreditation and valorisation of 
human capital and national distinctiveness.  
 
The ‘revenge’ of sovereignty on government is an effect of the neoliberal ambition to 
discretely pass executive decision over to exceptional centres of technocratic decision-
making, including private firms and central banks. It reasserts sovereignty as the ‘problem’, 
and not government, precisely because it becomes apparent that sovereignty is no longer 
centralised, unified and uncontested. To be sure, the metaphysics and divinity of 
decentralised economic government are arguably effects of the Christian valorisation of 
God’s infinite life-giving force, which marries biopolitics to transcendence, and not simply the 
achievement of neoliberalism (Agamben, 2011; Leshem, 2016). But the crucial thing today is 
that this is now recognised, and ‘the economy’ can no longer be treated as an object 
governed by immanent causality. Sovereignty becomes a problem because it has broken 
free of its traditional solutions, as they had appeared as convincing displays and 
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performances. Where the populist right finds itself in government, it does not dramatically 
rediscover a territorially-bound sovereign force, as in the Westphalian imaginary, but strikes 
alliances and combinations with non-state centres of sovereign power, in the financial sector 
and platform capitalism. One thing that these plural centres of decision share is a rejection 
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